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In  most  universities  it  is  as  if  professors  work  with  what  economists  call 
diseconomies of scope. They are not broadly diversified in their knowledge 
and  output,  in  most  cases  they  have  a  rather  limited  scope,  they  are 
specialized. In fact it is not unusual to observe that the higher the ranking of 
the professor (according to usual measurable standards), the more specialized 
she or he is. And so the top, the star scientist, is a little bit like the famous 
racing cyclist who won the Tour de France 7 times (so far?).   
  Most  people  would  agree,  at  least  in  Belgium,  with  a  slight 
chauvinistic inspiration, that true greatness is found only in a champion like, 
you know who, a champion who not only repeatedly wins specific important 
contests, like the Tour de France, but also world championships and classic 
(sort  of  grand  slam)  races.  Such  a  star  is  simply  more  complete  in  his 
excellence.   
  The races in science in many cases are so different and demanding 
that specialization makes perfect sense and, like in Adam Smith’s pin factory, 
increase overall productivity. But many problems and phenomena studied in 
economics, management, sociology, political science, parts of psychology and 
philosophy are in fact, if not identical, very similar. All of these disciplines 
study,  for  example,  rivalry  and  cooperation  in  non  market  environments. 
Therefore steps towards unification of analysis very probably are worthwhile. 
But  with  specialization  of  scientists  it  is  hard  to  do.  So  we  need  more 
complete top scientists, with a broad scope of talents and expertise. Professor 
David Baron is such a scientist. 
  Dave Baron is a chaired Professor of Political Economy and Strategy 
(David  S.  and  Ann  M.  Barlow  endowed  chair)  at  the  Graduate  School  of 
Business,  Stanford  University.  He  moved  to  Stanford  in  1981  from  the 
Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University, after obtaining in 
1968 a Doctor of Business Administration from Indiana University and an 
MBA from Harvard University in 1964. 
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  He has been a visiting professor at Harvard, Princeton, Université 
D’Aix-Marseille, and the Catholic University of Leuven. Baron has delivered 
distinguished lectures at Harvard, Indiana and Northwestern University. At 
the Kellogg School of Management of Northwestern, he was a teacher of the 
year,  and  chairman  of  and  professor  at  the  department  of  Managerial 
Economics and Decision Sciences; there he was a key player in building that 
department into a world class place for research and teaching in managerial 
economics and game theory. Shortly after his arrival in Stanford he founded a 
whole new field and approach to political economics for business, he later 
was  voted  best  teacher  of  the  year  in  the  Ph.D.  program,  served  as  the 
associate  dean  of  academic  affairs,  and  last  year  received  the  prestigious 
Robert T. Davis award for lifetime service.  
  Baron  is  or  has  been  on  the  editorial  boards  of  the  “American 
Economic Review”, the “Quarterly Journal of Economics” and the “Journal of 
Economics and Management Strategy”, he is a Fellow of the Econometric 
Society, the author of several books including the fifth edition of his best 
selling textbook on “Business and its Environment”, he has about 50 articles 
published in first rate, high impact journals (what we call here A journals) in 
management, statistics, finance, political science, general economics, public 
economics, industrial economics, and information economics. A number of 
his publications are extensively cited.  
  By the end of the 1970’s economists had no doubt that regulation of 
competitive industries and public utilities lacked in many cases effectiveness 
and  efficiency.  This  led  them  to  recommend  privatization,  liberalization, 
deregulation  and  improvements  in  regulation.  A  worldwide  trend  was  the 
surge of so called incentive regulation. It means that the regulator delegates 
certain pricing decisions to the firm and that the firm can reap profit increases 
from  cost  reductions.  It  also  means  the  regulator  recognizes  the  firm’s 
information advantage. The corresponding ideas and the search for incentive 
mechanisms  received  in  1982  a  substantial  and  innovative  burst  from  the 
contribution of Dave Baron (with Roger Myerson) in an Econometrica article 
“Regulating  a  Monopolist  with  Unknown  Costs”.  The  price  regulation  is 
modeled as a Bayesian game in which the regulator chooses a mechanism that 
is optimal given the optimal response of the firm, and given that mechanism 
the firm chooses an optimal strategy conditional on its private information. By 
the  revelation  principle,  the  regulator  can  restrict  attention  to  the  class  of 
incentive  compatible  mechanisms,  such  that  the  firm  has  no  incentive  to 
misrepresent its type. A rich literature on incentive regulation developed with 
Dave Baron, French, UK and other economists contributing. New regulatory 
practices such as price cap regulation, while not Bayesian, at least do away 
with regulation mechanisms relying on observable characteristics.  
  All of this came after Baron’s research on the effects of traditional 
regulation based on characteristics such as rate of return on invested capital 
that he started during his Leuven visit in the academic year 1977-1978. It was 
also in that period that the analysis of asymmetric information in decision 
theoretic and game theoretic settings began to flourish. And as is so typical of   3 
Dave Baron, he not only saw quickly the potential of these new methods, but 
was  even  faster  in  using  them  creatively  in  his  innovative  research.  He 
presented early contributions on asymmetric information theories in a doctoral 
course here in Leuven, well before this material became standard all over the 
world. 
  Regulation is only a small part of the relations that exist between 
firms and their non market environment. In the beginning of the eighties we 
saw the birth of new analytics of market strategies (competitive, corporate) at 
the  east  coast  of  the  United  States  (with  Michael  Porter)  and  almost 
simultaneously,  but  at  the  west  coast  in  Stanford,  Dave  Baron  began  to 
develop the new analytics of non market strategies. In the market environment 
firms  interact  with  consumers,  employees,  suppliers,  and  capital  through 
voluntary  exchange  underpinned  by  a  system  of  property  rights.  The  non 
market environment is composed of the social, political and legal structures in 
whose context firms interact with stakeholders, governments and the public. 
As Europeans we should welcome the development of this new field on the 
management of the non market environment. The current European culture 
after all, in many instances, tends to give a lot of weight to non market aspects 
in the political and institutional environment. While market transactions of 
goods  and  money  are  very  important,  they  are  but  a  small  part  of  what 
people’s activities involve in almost all organizations and society at large. 
Many top business schools in the US have imitated his move and since 1995 
we  have  also  in  Leuven  courses  on  “Political  Business  Strategy”  and  on 
“Politics  and  Business”  taught  by  one  of  Baron’s  former  Ph.D.  Students, 
professor Christophe Crombez.  
  Why did Dave Baron, and not someone else, start this new field? 
Being incredibly fast in seeing and using the potential of new technologies for 
research, helps, of course. But in addition, he showed the energy and talent to 
learn the details, with openness and honesty, of the relevant institutional and 
real world aspects, and the related contributions made by other disciplines. 
Most of his theory papers go far beyond referring to a few stylized facts.   
  A good first example of this is perhaps his influential work (with 
John  Ferejohn)  on  “Bargaining  in  Legislatures”  published  in  1989  in  the 
American  Political  Science  Review.  In  one  of  the  most  important 
accomplishments  in  social  sciences,  Nobel  laureate  Kenneth  Arrow 
demonstrated in 1963 that it is generally impossible to design institutions that 
aggregate the diverse preferences of individuals to make a social choice in a 
manner consistent with a set of reasonable conditions. It was shown in 1976 
that when voting reflects people’s preferences over multiple characteristics, 
typically chaos will result in the sense that, anything can happen and whoever 
controls the order of voting can determine the final outcome.  
  Presenting such findings to young people carries the danger of them 
prematurely  developing  a  cynical  attitude.  But  in  fact  political  decision 
making  works  differently  from  a  setting  just  mentioned  wherein  all 
alternatives are compared to all other alternatives.  Lawmakers for example 
work within given structures (parliamentary committees) and bargain within   4 
rules for agenda formation and voting. Dave Baron was the first to develop 
and analyze a game theoretic framework capturing these elements. He was 
able to characterize what voting procedures are necessary and sufficient for 
self enforcing strategies (on what motions to make and how to vote), and to 
analyze for example, the choice of amendment rules. When no party has a 
majority of seats, the analysis predicts that the smallest part is most likely to 
be in the government. So he replaced chaos with a positive theory of how 
people organize for political decision making. 
  Another  more  recent  example  is  his  1997  work  in  which  he 
integrates the market and non market strategies of Kodak and Fuji film in a 
formal theory of the resolution of trade disputes and the subsequent effects on 
market competition. The background is the 1995 Eastman Kodak complaint 
on alleged unfair Japanese distribution practices. His framework employs a 
Bertrand  Nash  game  in  prices  and  a  super  game  equilibrium  to  model 
sustainable  Japanese  concessions  on  opening  distribution  systems.  The 
consequences of trade negotiations between governments are captured by a 
Nash bargaining solution, the parameters of which the firms can influence 
through their non market strategies. This way he is able to grasp this very 
complicated  web  of  interactions,  and  to  better  understand  the  synergies 
between market and non market strategies of global competitors.  
  And thus today the field of political strategy is flourishing. We see 
researchers  in  business  schools  clarifying  phenomena  far  from  the  market 
such as the pros and cons of the jury voting procedures in murder trials. Dave 
Baron, in recent work, presents asymmetric information games to endogenize 
information  provision.  This  work  explains,  for  example,  the  emergence  of 
informational  alliances  with  no  hierarchy;  say  between  suppliers  of 
automobile parts, that Pareto dominate mergers, independent contracting and 
hierarchical contracting. But it also tackles informational competition between 
interest groups trying to influence public sentiment, with media, because of 
their  role  in  society,  having  an  incentive  to  bias  reporting  in  favor  of 
regulation.  
  Professor  Dave  Baron  is  a  unique  scholar  in  economics  and 
management science, because of the depth and creativity of his research and 
teaching, but also because of the broad scope of his work, covering not only 
several  existing  subfields,  but  also  inventing  new  crossings  to  other 
disciplines. He made lasting contributions to the unification of social sciences. 
His career is an example for all times and we in Leuven have been lucky and 
are grateful to have benefited from his expertise, support and leadership.   
  Om al deze redenen, mijnheer de rector, verzoek ik U, op voordracht 
van de Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische Wetenschappen en 
na  goedkeuring  door  de  Academische  Raad,  het  eredoctoraat  van  de 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven te willen verlenen aan professor David Baron.  
 
Leuven, 8 november 2005  